CONSTRUCTING JERUSALEM

MORAVIAN MISSIONARIES AND FRONTIER DIPLOMACY IN COLONIAL PENNSYLVANIA, 1742-1763

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**Table of Contents**

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 3

Chapter 1: Origins – Moravian Tactics and the *Civitas Indiana-Germana* ........................................... 11

Chapter 2: Moravians as Frontier Peacekeepers, 1746-1752 ................................................................. 23

Chapter 3: “A Future Harvest” – Moravians as Government Agents, 1753-1762 ............................... 36

Epilogue: The Collapse of a Dream, 1763 .............................................................................................. 52

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................... 55

Appendix of Maps ................................................................................................................................... 59
Introduction

On November 24th, 1755, a group of around fifteen Moravians gathered for an evening meal at their mission house in Gnadenhütten, Pennsylvania. The German missionaries, who were convalescing after a day of tending to their crops and preaching to Indian converts in the mission town, expected a quiet night. Indeed, since establishing their town – the name of which literally meant “huts of grace” – in 1746 on the banks of the Lehigh River, the Moravians had maintained peaceful relations with the natives they had come to convert.1 In June of 1749, the half-brother of Delaware leader Teedyuscung noted in a visit to the settlement that the Christian Indians “were very happy & contented in their Hearts.”2 But this was not a night like any other. Two days earlier, an Indian named Jemmy had arrived near Gnadenhütten to warn his Delaware mother that she should flee east to the town of Nescopeck, lest she meet “with the same, nay worse Usage than the white people.”3 Outside the town, a force of Native American warriors including members of the Delaware, Shawnee, and Iroquois nations, were gathering for an attack on white settlements near the Forks of the Delaware.4

Suddenly, there was a knock on the door, and a party of roughly twelve Indians “in a very rude Manner demanded Admittance, which the people were unwilling to allow them.”5 When a young missionary finally opened the door, a warrior standing on the steps quickly fired inside the house, killing another missionary at the table. Some of the Moravians attempted to flee up the stairs, but were carried back into the dining room and murdered. The warriors killed five whites in the

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1 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from German and French language documents are my own.
3 Pennsylvania Gazette, Dec. 4, 1755
4 Jane Merritt, At the Crossroads: Indians & Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 185
5 Pennsylvania Gazette, Dec. 4, 1755
house, and when another man managed to escape out the back door, they shot him in the back and scalped him. The young boy who answered the door miraculously escaped out of a window, and fled Gnadenhütten as it burned to the ground behind him.\textsuperscript{6}

The attack scattered the white and convert residents of Gnadenhütten, driving many of them to the protective arms of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, the heart of the Moravian missionary network in North America. On November 30\textsuperscript{th}, shortly after arriving at Bethlehem, the converts of Gnadenhütten enlisted the help of a Moravian scribe to send an urgent petition to Robert Hunter Morris, the lieutenant governor of Pennsylvania. Casting themselves as reformed savages, whom the Moravians had rescued from their heathen ways, the natives said that, “It is our desire…to put ourselves as Children under the Protection of this Government. We cannot say otherwise but that we are entirely devoted to the English Government.”\textsuperscript{7} However, the Moravians were not only vessels for Indian petitions. In March of 1756, with the refugees from the massacre still living at Bethlehem, Moravian bishop Joseph Spangenberg sent a letter to Benjamin Franklin – at the time a member of the Pennsylvania Assembly – demanding protection from colonial militia and frontier forts. He concluded the letter by requesting supplies of food and medicine for the converts at Bethlehem.\textsuperscript{8}

The Moravians were German Pietists that arrived on the shores of British North America in 1739 with a mission to spread the Gospels to the natives. After an abortive attempt to settle in Savannah Georgia, they eventually migrated up the east coast, establishing mission towns in New York and, to a greater extent, Pennsylvania. But as the attack on Gnadenhütten reveals, the mid-

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{6} Ibid
Atlantic frontier on which the Moravians made their home was a fluid, dynamic, and often violent place. Land-hungry white settlers pushed westward onto Indian land, provoking frequent confrontations with Native Americans looking to halt their tribes’ patterns of westward migration.9 Throughout the mid-eighteenth century, the Moravians found themselves caught between the expansionist predations of white settlers and the defensive impulses of the native tribes, most notably the Delaware and other members of the British-allied Iroquois Confederacy.10 (See Figure 1 for regional map).

In this paper, I examine the political role of the Moravians in this tumultuous and complex political environment. I ground my analysis in the argument that the Moravians sought to establish a sovereign religious state of German and Indian communities in the mid-Atlantic wilderness, which I join with ethnohistorian Siegrun Kaiser in labeling a Civitas Indiana-Germana.11 This state would allow the Moravians to convert the natives of Pennsylvania while also dispatching missionaries throughout the continent. In essence, Moravian religious goals depended on an inescapably political project, an approach that made religious salvation inextricable from political affairs. Given its emphasis on missionary work, this was a truly distinct conception of religious practice in colonial North America.

To be sure, the Puritans of New England also melded religion with civil governance, and sought to construct a society that would be a paragon of Christian virtue. However, as Sam Haselby has

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9 A comprehensive overview of forced Indian migration in the mid-eighteenth century, particularly with respect to the Pennsylvania Delaware (Lenape), comes from Axel Utz, “Cultural Exchange, Imperialist Violence, and Pious Missions: Local Perspectives from Tanjavur and Lenape Country, 1720--1760” (Ph.D, The Pennsylvania State University, 2011).

10 Following the Walking Purchase of 1737, which ceded roughly 1.2 million acres of Lenape land to the Pennsylvania government, Delaware tribes in the east were driven into the Shamokin and Wyoming Valleys, where they interacted most closely with the Moravian missionaries. An additional group of Delaware refugees joined with Shawnee and Iroquois tribesmen to form a loose confederacy on the other side of the Ohio River. These “Ohio Indians” would be the main focus of Moravian diplomatic outreach during the Seven Years’ War, which I will discuss later in this paper. A more complete exposition on the relation of the Delaware to the Moravians can be found in Merritt, At the Crossroads.

11 Siegrun Kaiser, Die Delaware Und Die Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine: Konflikte Einer Missionierung, 1741-1806, (Masters, Goethe-Universitat, 1992), 35, 74-75; Kaiser describes the Civitas Indiana-Germana as a “self-managed community” that gave only “passive obedience to the state.” “No citizenship would be accepted, no oath spoken, and no military service performed.” [Translated from the original German]
pointed out, Puritans were an *exclusionary* group that killed the few Native Americans that converted to Congregationalism in the seventeenth century. The Moravians, on the other hand, radically understood their prospective state as a mechanism for the *incorporation* of natives into settler society through conversion to Christianity.¹²

Using this unique goal as a starting point, this paper argues that the Moravian attempt to establish an inclusive religious state aided British imperial expansion in Pennsylvania. In order to consolidate support for the *Civitas Indiana-Germana*, the Moravians formed fruitful economic, cultural, and social relationships with Pennsylvania Indians. These alliances not only furthered the Moravian goal of Christianizing the natives, but also alleviated sources of tension that could otherwise explode into violence against defiant British settlers. Ultimately, the planned Moravian state became a “buffer” for British imperialism, a space of slower, gentler assimilation that delayed Indian retaliation against increasingly aggressive Europeans. By 1754, when war with France ravaged the colonial frontier and missionaries fled the massacre at Gnadenhütten, the Moravians cooperated with Protestant British forces in the hope that a British victory would provide the security and stability required to maintain the *Civitas* in North America. As such, throughout the middle of the eighteenth century, the Moravians found themselves entangled in a symbiotic relationship with one of the continent’s two great political powers.

A nuanced and in-depth examination of how the Moravians participated in colonial politics, and the impact this had on the spread of British imperialism, is conspicuously absent from the historical literature. Instead, past analyses have used the Moravians to make a broader point about frontier relationships between Indians and colonists. The most notable example of this is Jane Merritt’s, *At The Crossroads: Indians & Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763*. Merritt argued that through association with Moravians and other European colonists, Indians adopted

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Euroamerican practices like Christianity as “new strategies for survival” in the face of white settlement. As a result of these alliances, Merritt argued, tribes like the Delaware became “disaffected with the Six Nations,” who claimed authority over them and eventually sought to force them back into their sphere of influence. This emphasis on alliance-building with whites as an Indian survival strategy was also the primary theme of Amy Schutt’s *Peoples of the River Valleys: the odyssey of the Delaware Indians*, even though Schutt’s text did not discuss Moravians at length. Both authors built on Richard White’s seminal monograph, *The middle ground: Indians, empires, and republics in the Great Lakes region, 1650-1815*, which outlined a concept he called the “middle ground.” This described the negotiated economic and political relationships that emerged between the two societies when neither had the necessary force – or indeed the interest – to subjugate the other.

James Merrell’s *Into the Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier*, a broader history of diplomatic go-betweens between whites and Indians in the colony, rejected the concept of a middle ground between the natives and Pennsylvania settlers. Rather, Merrell argued that, “Negotiators were not, it turns out, denizens of some debatable land between native and newcomer; almost without exception, they were firmly anchored on one side of the cultural divide or the other.” In his view, Moravians were no exception. Merrell portrayed the group as unable to penetrate the veil of suspicion that surrounded their culturally distinct – and often inebriated – Indian neighbors. As such, he asserted that the missionaries “had their eyes fixed not on this world but the next,” and therefore chose to abstain from political affairs on the frontier. Peter Silver and Gregory Evans Dowd compounded this approach from a religious perspective. Silver’s *Our Savage Neighbors* and

13 Merritt, *At the Crossroads*, 6-7
17 Merrell, *Into the American Woods*, 87
Dowd’s *A Spirited Resistance* both argue that Moravian and European encroachment provoked a militant nativist movement, which drew on shared Indian religious experiences to fight the “disturbing novelties that came with diversity.” According to these authors, there was no accommodation on the frontier, but rather division.\(^\text{18}\)

In the context of this broader debate about accommodation and suspicion in frontier relationships, this thesis finds White and Merritt’s analysis to be more convincing. However, it also intervenes in existing scholarship by examining how middle ground alliances between Moravians and Indians affected colonial politics and British imperialism. Although Merritt and White focused on the synthesis of colonial and Indian cultures, they did not consider the impact these relationships on maintaining frontier peace, thereby ignoring the importance of the proposed Moravian state on British expansion in Pennsylvania. As Merrell’s argument demonstrated, colonial historians have been content to view the Moravians as purely religious actors without an interest in political matters. This thesis fills that gap through its discussion of the *Civitas Indiana-Germana* as an imperial buffer that prevented violent backlash against white settlers.\(^\text{19}\) It therefore uses Moravian theology and actions to position the missionaries as both political and religious actors.

The paper is divided into three chapters. Chapter I analyzes the foundational principles of Moravian missionary theology, with a specific focus on the *Civitas Indiana-Germana*. It concludes by examining the expulsion of the Moravians from their mission town at Shekomeko, N.Y. in 1745. The turmoil of this event emphasized to the Moravians that cooperation with civil authority, rather than outright defiance, was essential for achieving religious ends. Chapter II focuses on the


\(^{19}\) My discussion of the intersection between negotiated alliances and frontier peace also draws on Ian Preston, *The texture of contact: European and Indian settler communities on the frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667-1783*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009; “Local relationships between European and Indian communities were as important in maintaining peace as the alliances orchestrated by the British, French, and Iroquois diplomats.” (5)
Moravians after 1746, when Pennsylvania became the main base of operations in North America. It argues that through their work with native communities, the Moravians helped to maintain peace between the Indians and British.\(^{20}\) By providing access to British goods; lending craftsmen to Indian villages; and establishing political ties with native tribes, the Moravians created a buffer that helped to quell potential native discontent in the face of white settlement.\(^{21}\) Finally, Chapter III expands on the official Moravian role during the Seven Years’ War. It contradicts Merrell’s view that Moravians were relatively uninvolved with frontier diplomacy, instead demonstrating that they saw continued English rule as essential for the establishment of a religious utopia. As a result, they played an important role in managing refugee camps, carrying messages to natives, and lending their religious legitimacy to negotiations with French-allied Indians.

Thus, this essay will position the Moravians as unique colonial agents, with an interest in civil affairs and a sectarian religious dream. Indeed, to understand them as insular hermits is to divorce them from historical context. The assumption that the Moravians merely cultivated crops in their mission towns while tensions flared along the frontier is nothing more than a simple fiction. By attempting to establish a religious state on the Pennsylvania frontier, the Moravians lived side-by-side with the same natives that the British hoped to conquer, and as such could not extricate themselves from the political realities of the time. Ultimately, Moravian missionary efforts would aid in the subjugation of the very people they had come to America to save.

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\(^{21}\) The discussion of economic relationships in this chapter draws on Stefan Hertrampf, *Unsere Indianer-Geschwister Waren Lichte und Vergnügt: Die Herrnhuter als Missionare bei den Indianern Pennsylvanias, 1745-1765*, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1997), 175-197.
Chapter I - Origins: Moravian Tactics and the *Civitas Indiana-Germana*

Count Nicolaus von Zinzendorf, the ecumenical leader of the Moravian Church, arrived in Philadelphia from Europe on December 10, 1741. Along with a small group of loyal missionaries, he
founded the mission town of Bethlehem on Christmas Eve, thereby establishing the centerpiece of Moravian operations in Pennsylvania.  

From his base at Bethlehem, Zinzendorf would strike out on three expeditions into the continental interior, all with the intention of establishing relationships with the Indians on the mid-Atlantic frontier.  In his personal diaries, he wrote of his desire to build an intimate connection between the Moravians and the “heathen” of the American woods. Indeed, Zinzendorf blamed the imperial squabbles of the French and English for instilling in the Indians a “hatred for religious matters.” Prior to a September 1742 conference with the chiefs of the Six Nations at Schuylkill, New York – at which Zinzendorf would establish good relations between the Moravians and Iroquois – the count remarked that, “When I preach among [the natives], they will judge, from the similarity of our manner of speech, that we are the same sort of people.”  

During the conference, Zinzendorf received permission to preach among the Iroquois tribes, and received a long string of white wampum from the chiefs in recognition of the alliance.

However, as Zinzendorf attempted to lay the foundation for a budding Indo-Moravian relationship in 1742, missionaries at the Moravian town of Shekomeko, N.Y. were facing increased scrutiny from colonial officials. The Moravians established Shekomeko in 1740, one year before the founding of their North American “capital” of Bethlehem. During the first half of the 1740s, however, the missionaries and converted natives in the town faced intense suspicion from locals and English officials, who feared that they were French Catholic agents bent on manipulating the

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22 The Native Americans to whom the Moravians preached included the Delaware, Shawnee, and members of the Iroquois Confederacy. The Confederacy, also known as the Six Nations, was comprised of the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora tribes.  

23 William Cornelius Reichel, ed., *Memorials of the Moravian Church*, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1870), 14-16. Reichel’s compilation is an important source for essential writings of Zinzendorf, given that the count wrote in a nearly illegible Gothic German script.  

24 Nicolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf, “Account of Second and Third Journeys among the Indians,” in Eugene Schaeffer, “From Zinzendorf’s diary of his second, and in part of kind third journey among the Indians, the former to Shekomeko, and the other among the Shawanese, on the Susquehanna,” *Transactions of the Moravian Historical Society* 1:3 (1868), 84  

allegiance of the local Mohican Indians.\textsuperscript{26} Put differently, Moravian missionary work did not happen in a vacuum, but was always dependent on at least tacit approval from civil authorities. The unorthodox methods of the Moravians, as well as the missionaries’ closeness to the local Mohican natives, would result in frequent clashes with the New York authorities throughout the first half of the 1740s. Suspicion of the Moravians came to a head in 1744 with the outbreak of King George’s War. This was the North American theater of the War of Austrian Succession, and the third of four colonial wars fought between the British, French, and their respective Indian allies. Confronted with popular fear of the Moravians, as well as persistent Moravian refusal to accede to the wartime demands of the colonial government, New York expelled the Moravians from the colony in the fall of 1744.

In light of Moravian relationships with natives and colonial officials, this chapter is divided into two parts. First, I examine Moravian missionary theology and practices, with a specific emphasis on Moravian plans for the establishment of a sovereign religious utopia in British North America. This approach helps us understand the “blessing” of these tactics, as exemplified by the success of Moravian envoys to the Six Nations in the early stages of their settlement in North America. It also isolates this utopian vision as a new interpretive lens to understand Moravian political action, thereby laying essential groundwork for Chapters II and III. But if the first section of this chapter deals with the “blessing” of Moravian tactics, the second section discusses the “curse.” I argue that the Moravian expulsion from Shekomeko, N.Y. in 1744 was a product of the suspicion their tactics engendered. Chastened by their experience, the Moravians eventually fled to the relative religious freedom of Pennsylvania.

\textsuperscript{26} For a general overview of the events at Shekomeko between 1740 and 1745, see Karl-Wilhelm Westmeier, \textit{The Evacuation of Shekomeko and the Early Moravian Missions to Native North Americans}, (Lewiston, N.Y: Edwin Mellen Press, 1994).
Developing a relationship with the Five Nations was essential for the Moravians, because their proselytizing strategy depended on prolonged contact with their target native populations. Indeed, Zinzendorf’s broader vision for the mid-Atlantic frontier was to create a sovereign community of Iroquois-German settlements, which Kaiser has helpfully labeled a Civitas Indiana-Germana.27 This state would exist beyond the geographic reaches of the colonial governments, and therefore provide the blank canvas upon which the Moravians could build a religious utopia that would convert the Native Americans. Zinzendorf announced his plan to establish such a system in a synod of the Moravian Church at Gotha, Germany in January 1740, nine months before he departed for North America.28 While at Onondaga – the capital of the Iroquois Confederacy and modern-day Syracuse, N.Y. – he alluded to his “entirely peculiar” hope that the council would allow Moravians to “live among their towns as friends, until we should get to know each other better.”29 He also described the state to Pennsylvania negotiator Conrad Weiser, who accompanied him on his inland expedition. “We must get a Proprietorship in America immediately from the Crown…governed in the English manner,” he told Weiser in 1742. “But not in Warlike Manner, no Forts & no Harbours, and not devoted to commerce lest it incur the jealousy of neighboring governments.”30

Zinzendorf’s personal diaries, however, revealed a more concrete formulation of the Civitas Indiana-Germana. In a November 1742 entry entitled, “Division of the Field: A Plan of Operations,” Zinzendorf divided the Civitas into five bases of operation: Bethlehem, Otstonwakin, Shekomeko,

27 Kaiser, 74-75
29 Zinzendorf, “Account of Second and Third Journeys among the Indians,” 85
Wyoming, and Albany (See Figure 2 in Appendix). 31 Bethlehem would be the nerve center of the operation, while each of the four remaining outposts would attend to a different group of Indians. Albany would cover the tribes of New England, Shekomeko would manage New York, Wyoming would be a way-station for communication with the Six Nations at Onondaga, and Otstonwakin would be for reaching the “French half-breeds” of French Canada. 32 In December of 1744, the Bethlehem diaries indicated that the plan of action was “adopted by the five currently established missionary committees in Bethlehem, [Wyoming], Otstonwakin, [Shekomeko], and New England; each committee was given a nation, which is to apply for and seek out its own missionaries and assistants.” 33

The eventual expulsion of the Moravians from New York in 1744 made the planned Civitas Indiana-Germana unattainable in its original form, and there is little direct reference to the plan in later Moravian records. But although it appears a quixotic endeavor, the plan for a Civitas Indiana-Germana embodied the Moravian missionary ethic, and provided a lens through which Moravian political action can be coherently understood. The Moravians were unique for their willingness to live among the Indians, learn their languages, assist in the construction of village works, and abstain from aggressive proselytizing until the Indians came to them freely. 34 Indeed, this willingness to cooperate with the Indians was essential if the Moravians truly desired to live alongside the natives in a sovereign state. This set of practices not only made natives more comfortable around the

31 Otstonwakin was the birth village of Madame Mountour, a French-Indian interpreter who gave birth to the prominent métis – a descendant of European trappers and women of the Canadian First Nations – negotiator Andrew Montour. It was an important way station for Moravian missionaries, and Zinzendorf visited it during his travels on the Pennsylvania frontier.


33 December 13/24, 1742, Kenneth G. Hamilton, ed., The Bethlehem Diary: Volume 1, 1742-1744, (Bethlehem: Archives of the Moravian Church, 1971), 129; Brackets indicate names for which spelling has been changed to reflect modern conventions. Moravians often transcribed locations in spelling that aligned more closely with German pronunciation, so “Wyoming” appears in many documents as “Wajomik.”

missionaries, but also, as we will see in Chapter II, made the Moravians effective peacekeepers once they were forced onto the Pennsylvania frontier in the late 1740s.

These methods of proselytization were products of Moravian theology. The Moravians did not believe they could simply thrust the Gospels upon the masses of North America. They held that everyone had knowledge of the Christian God in their heart, but that this recognition could not be brought out through rote memorization and dull sermonizing. The Scriptural justification for this came from the First Epistle to the Romans, in which the Apostle Paul wrote that the people of Israel “have a zeal for god, but not according to knowledge.” Rather, the Moravians wanted to build friendships with the Indians and be in constant contact with them, in order to determine which heathen souls the Holy Spirit had prepared for conversion. This was known as the doctrine of “first fruits.” Zinzendorf stressed this approach during the Schuylkill conference with the Six Nations in 1742, when he told them that the Moravians were “a People who believe that before we tell the People something of our God, our God himself must first have spoken to their hearts.”

The main consequence of this approach was a rejection of Nationalbekehrungen, or national conversions. The natives would have to be brought to God on an individual basis, and that would require living among them, linguistic adaptability, and frequent “visits” to local natives.

Nurturing a corps of missionaries that understood the languages of the Iroquois tribes was essential to achieving the Civitas Indiana-Germana. Indeed, Zinzendorf understood linguistic instruction as the key to universalizing the message of the Gospels. In a Moravian synod in Holland

35 Romans 10:2; See Reichel, 118-119
39 Gallagher, 190
in May of 1746, he staked out a position of linguistic unity: “It has been said: unite all languages, etc. This is such a reality that, I believe, speaking in tongues does not mean that one should babble something in a language that no one understands; but, first…that everyone praises the lamb in his or her own language.”

The earliest leader of this campaign in North America was Johann Christoph Pyrlaeus, who was educated at the University of Leipzig and arrived in North America with the Moravians in 1741. By June 1743, he was actively seeking out opportunities to study Mohawk, the language of the most easterly Six Nations tribe. Later that year, he was studying the language at the Palatine settlement of Tulpehocken under the auspices of Conrad Weiser. In 1744, Pyrlaeus established a school for Indian languages at Bethlehem, which he would move to the newly established Gnadenhütten in 1746. Pyrlaeus continued to teach at Gnadenhütten until the settlement’s destruction in 1755, but his work had broader ramifications for Moravian missionary work. He routinely translated Moravian songs and hymns, which were essential to the church’s services, into indigenous languages. He also compiled the “Lexicon der macquaischen Sprachen,” a sprawling and often unorganized dictionary of German and Mohawk vocabulary that was the first comprehensive Moravian effort to understand the Mohawk language.

On the whole, Pyrlaeus’s efforts were representative of the broader Moravian commitment to engaging with Indians on their own cultural level.

Another tactic the Moravians used was the daily “visit” to natives in and around mission towns. These were not just friendly visits, but rather chances for the Moravians to speak with their native neighbors and examine which souls were ready for “first fruits” conversion. In Shamokin, an

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41 Erben, 307-310
42 June 24, 1743, “Shekomeko Diary,” Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 36, reel 1, item 4, Indigenous Peoples: North America; Erben, 308
43 September 2, 1747 and October 11, 1747, “Gnadenhutten Diary,” Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 36, reel 4, item 1, Indigenous Peoples: North America
44 Erben, 310
Indian town on the Susquehanna River at which the Moravians settled in 1747, Moravian women used visits to build relationships with Mohican and Delaware Indians. Anna Mack, the wife of the well-traveled missionary Martin Mack, appeared as a regular visitor in the Shamokin diaries, or the communal record that the missionaries kept of their time in Shamokin. This is likely because her knowledge of Mohican and other native languages easily outstripped her husband’s. In the diaries, Anna was said to have “gone visiting” and found a “goodly woman who was well suited to the ways of God,” or to have “had a good opportunity to talk with a [sick woman] about the Savior.”

Although the missionaries occasionally received a cool reception, the Indians in the diaries were often amazed at the Moravians’ relative lack of aggression. “Once again we went visiting across the [river],” reads an entry from October 4, 1747. “We told [the Indians] that we loved them and that was the reason why we had come here to visit them again. They marveled that we would make such a long journey out of love…”

Such practices not only helped the Moravians win converts, but also led to their acceptance into native communities as non-threatening Europeans, or even as members of a Native American clan. While visiting Indians in Shamokin, the Moravians frequently paid their respects to the Iroquois-installed headman of the town, Shikellamy. Moravian women would mend his shirts and perform other household chores, while the men took instruction from him in the various languages of Shamokin natives. As a consequence, Shikellamy accepted the Moravians more than other white visitors because he “knew us a little bit and we lived among [the natives].” In one particular episode, Shikellamy asked the resting missionaries whether the day was Sunday, their holy day of

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46 Ibid, October 4, 1747, [Faull, 11]
47 Ibid, December 30, 1747 and May 11, 1748 [Faull 80 and 114]
48 Ibid, November 3, 1745, [Faull, 28]
This act of reciprocity, of recognizing the Moravian Sabbath as a legitimate spiritual occasion, is a striking example of the willingness natives showed to accept the foreign missionaries into their lives.

Occasionally, native attitudes toward the Moravians went beyond mere acceptance, and ventured into symbolic adoption into native clans. The Moravian envoys to the Six Nations council at Onondaga displayed one such instance of this. (See Figure 3 in Appendix for location of Onondaga relative to Bethlehem). Insofar as the Six Nations claimed hegemony over the Indians of eastern Pennsylvania, the welfare of Moravian missionary efforts depended on staying within the good graces of the Iroquois. Zinzendorf had laid the foundation for an Iroquois-Moravian alliance at his conference at Schuylkill in 1742. The church, however, sent additional envoys in the 1740s and 1750s to reinforce the alliance, learn the Onondaga language, and, after the expulsion from Shekomeko, request permission to settle their missionaries and Indians on Iroquois lands in Pennsylvania. The symbolic adoption of the missionaries into Iroquois society began during a June 1745 envoy to Onondaga, which included David Zeisberger and August Gottlieb Spangenberg. During a stopover in Shamokin, the missionaries met with Shikellamy and were ceremonially adopted into the Iroquois Confederacy and given Indian names. Spangenberg became T’girbitontie, while Zeisberger took on the name of Ganousteracheri, and each missionary was accepted into a separate Iroquois clan. In all subsequent visits to the Six Nations at Onondaga, these men would only be addressed by their Indian names.50

Zeisberger returned to Onondaga in 1750 and 1752 to carry out an informal course of study in the Onondaga language. A June 1750 diary entry noted how his heart “burn[s] with love toward the Indian, willing to learn their language and adopt the Indian mode of life, an easy thing to do

49 Ibid, 28 June 1747, [Faull, 44]
50 Earl P. Olmstead, David Zeisberger: A Life Among the Indians, (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1997), 39-40
when prompted by love to them.”51 His diary entries on these visits were replete with cordial, and indeed fraternal, discussions with the Onondaga Indians. Indians welcomed him kindly into their huts, called him “brother,” and, perhaps most importantly, treated him as a native rather than a European settler. During a 1752 stay near Onondaga, Zeisberger recounted a violent encounter with a local Dutch rum trader, who “tried to excite the Indians to kill us, and in his anger tried to stab David [Zeisberger] with a knife.” After Zeisberger shared this story over a meal with the Iroquois chief Otschinachiatha, the chief assured him that the natives would protect him at Onondaga, and that the Moravians were “safe from Asseroni and traders.”52 The Iroquois used the term Asseroni as a broad label for white European settlers. In this offer of protection, Otschinachiatha distinguished Moravians from other European settlers, shifting them to the other side of the settler-Indian divide. Adopted into a native clan, Zeisberger was no longer Asseroni, but rather someone the Indians felt a duty to protect. The accommodationist tactics of the Moravians, therefore, not only enabled them to forge relationships with the natives, but also were also vital for the construction of a religious state.

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However, while Moravian tactics offered an advantage to missionaries facing west, they often harmed those still oriented toward the east. In New York and New England, the church faced constant suspicion in the years preceding King George’s War, which led directly to the dissolution of the Moravian mission at Shekomeko, N.Y. in 1744. During Zinzendorf’s return from Shekomeko in August 1742, a New York constable arrested him for Sabbath-breaking, eventually fining him eighteen pounds sterling.53 One year later, in the face of charges that they were “Popish,” the

51 Wednesday, 6-17 June, “Diary of the Journey of Br. Cammerhoff and David Zeisberger to the Five Nations from May 3-14 to August 6-17, 1750,” in Beauchamp, ed., Moravian Journals Relating to Central New York, 1745-1766, 43
missionaries Pyrlaeus, Mack, and Joseph Shaw went before a group of magistrates in Milford, Connecticut, who banned them from preaching in Connecticut without explicit government permission. As tensions grew between the British and French, locals began to associate Moravian closeness to the Shekomeko Mohicans as a Catholic attempt to curry native favor for an upcoming war. In January of 1744, the Shekomeko town diary noted that “two low German men”, one of whom was later identified as a justice of the peace in New York, came to Shekomeko to “see what kind of people you are.” The residents of nearby towns had been saying “many evil things” about the Moravians, and worried that the missionaries and their Indian flock would set upon them at night and kill them in their sleep. In nearby Filkentown, the two men reported, people were so afraid they could no longer sleep, and had demanded that the government send a justice to examine the Moravians at Shekomeko.

By May of 1744, speculation about the Moravians had grown to fantastic extremes. The Shekomeko diary noted “a great rumor in the country that we had received 2 Barrels of Gun-Powder or 1 Barrel of Balls, which has put the People into a Pannick fear of us and our Indians, because they think we are Roman Catholicks and have a Connexion with the French.” The refusal of the Moravians to comply with the demands of the New York government, which was preparing for the upcoming war with the French, hardly did them any favors. The Shekomeko missionary Gottlieb Büttnner recorded a series of meetings with a New York colonial militia captain, who demanded their presence at militia musters, as well as oaths “to King George” and “against Catholicism.” Moravian

55 Shekomeko Diary, January 20, 1744
theology, however, prohibited the missionaries from actively taking up arms, and also forbade oaths of allegiance to civil authority. In a series of to the captain, Büttner repeatedly refused to comply.\textsuperscript{56}

Ultimately, suspicion and distrust of the Moravians among locals and government officials became too great. On September 21, 1744, the New York legislature passed a law banning any group that lived among the Indians with the purpose of converting them. A day later, the legislature passed another law requiring all missionaries within the province to take an oath of allegiance to King George.\textsuperscript{57} In essence, the government prohibited the Moravians from exercising the foundational element of their missionary strategy, which required them to live among the natives and adopt their customs. On December 15\textsuperscript{th}, envoys from Albany arrived at the Shekomeko mission to announce that the Moravians were in the colony illegally, and would have to abandon their settlement.\textsuperscript{58} The Moravian evacuation was slow, however, and their continued presence in New York increased tensions with the surrounding locals. According to a Moravian conference held at Bethlehem in October of 1745, nearby locals feared the Moravian Indians so much that they attended church with rifles. Church leaders at the conference also noted that the government of New York had arrested Moravian preachers on the grounds that they were French agents. By the end of 1745, the remaining Indians at Shekomeko voiced their desire to travel to the Moravian strongholds of Nazareth and Bethlehem, believing that Pennsylvania’s greater religious tolerance might provide more protection from the predations of the government.\textsuperscript{59} Indeed, the Moravians founded their settlement at Gnadenhütten – which was destroyed in 1755 – to accommodate the influx of Indian converts streaming into Pennsylvania from New York.

By the latter half of the 1740s, the Moravians began to realize that distancing themselves from civil authority was a recipe for disaster. The expulsion from Shekomeko was a warning that the 

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, May 1744  
\textsuperscript{57} Westmeier, 318-341  
\textsuperscript{58} Shekomeko Diary, December 15, 1744  
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, October 26-28, 1745
success of their missionary effort depended on the protection of colonial governments with more power than their fledgling religious community. At the same time, however, their unique missionary tactics enabled them to exist peacefully in native towns and missionary settlements. Thus, their success when facing west was not matched when facing east. The loss of Shekomeko opened up a new chapter for the Moravians in North America. As the exiles from the New York mission flooded into Pennsylvania and constructed frontier settlements like Gnadenhütten, the Moravians employed their conversionary tactics to act as peacekeepers on the frontier. Flourishing under the religious liberty of Pennsylvania, the frontier Moravians became sources of economic and political power for the Pennsylvania Indians, thereby helping to maintain peace up until the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in 1754.

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Chapter II – Moravians as Frontier Peacekeepers, 1746-1752

The expulsion from Shekomeko made Pennsylvania, a relative bastion of religious liberty, the main theater for Moravian operations in North America. Even as his brethren faced pressure

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60 The Moravians were also lobbying Parliament in the 1740s to exempt the Church from the oaths of allegiance that were otherwise required to live in the colonies. In 1749, Parliament passed an act to that effect, recognizing the Moravians as an “ancient Protestant Episcopal” church of “sober, quiet, and industrious People.” Combined with Pennsylvania’s guarantee of religious liberty, which the church received from Pennsylvania Governor George Thomas in 1746, this cemented the Moravians’ protected status in the
from New York authorities in 1745, missionary Martin Mack began to explore the fringes of the Pennsylvania frontier. On September 16th, 1745, Mack and his wife Anna arrived at the Indian town of Shamokin, Pennsylvania on the Susquehanna River. Armed only with a passport from Conrad Weiser – the Pennsylvania German negotiator who served as the government’s primary diplomat to the Native Americans – the couple opted to remain in Shamokin “as long as it pleased [the Lamb] and his community of the cross.”\textsuperscript{61} Shortly after arriving in the Indian town, the Macks began to build relationships with their native neighbors. In late October of the same year, they traveled across the Susquehanna to attend a festival of Delaware Indians, who told them that, “as far as they were concerned, we could stay here forever.” One of the Indians ordered his compatriots to “leave our friends some food, and brought us a piece of meat from his portion.”\textsuperscript{62}

Even after the celebration ended, the Moravian couple continued to visit the friends they made at the festival, and wrote fondly about an old man and woman who both seemed likely candidates for a “first fruits” conversion.\textsuperscript{63} This success stood in stark contrast to the failures of more aggressive and conventional missionaries like the traveling Presbyterian minister David Brainerd, who appeared multiple times in Martin Mack’s diary entries. Brainerd complained to the Moravians that he could never “get [the Indians] together to preach a few words to them about God,” and when he returned to Shamokin in October of 1745, the Indians “avoided him however they could.”\textsuperscript{64} Just weeks after coming to Shamokin, however, the Macks had used their unique accommodationist tactics to plant the seeds of a fruitful Indo-Moravian relationship in the frontier town.

\textsuperscript{61} “Shamokin Diary,” September 16, 20, 1745, [Faull, 1, 6]
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, [Faull, 21-22]
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid, [Faull, 23]
Historians have disputed whether the Moravians truly established meaningful relationships with Indians on the Pennsylvania frontier. James Merrell has argued that upon arriving in Shamokin, the Moravians faced “a barrier these [natives and settlers] had built and one that they could not, would not, tear down.” However, further examination of diaries and journals from Moravians at Shamokin and Gnadenhütten, along with Pennsylvania government records, tells a different story. (See Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix for the respective locations of the two settlements). In this chapter, I argue that the Moravians did not augment the gap between whites and Indians on the frontier, but rather were essential in moderating tensions between the two sides. In their pursuit of the Moravian state outlined in Chapter I, they forged intimate economic relationships with the Indians; mediated potentially violent interactions with traders; served as a source of supply for Indians facing famine; and helped Indians remain on or near ancestral lands. Thus, the construction of a Civitas Indiana-Germana led to the creation of an imperial buffer, a space of gentler assimilation that delayed Indian retaliation against British settlers. In this way, Moravians did not exist on one side of an impassable chasm between whites and Indians, but rather were central in mediating and preventing grievances that could otherwise prompt natives to strike back against whites on the frontier.

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Despite their initial success, it must be acknowledged that Martin and Anna Mack did not face a universally warm reception when they came to Shamokin in September of 1745. Upon arriving at the town, Martin and Anna met with Madame Montour, the mother of prominent métis negotiator Andrew Montour, who had accompanied the Macks to Shamokin at Weiser’s request. In a lamentation that served as a warning to the two optimistic missionaries, Madame Montour noted

66 The métis trace their ancestry to the First Nations of Canada and European settlers. Andrew Montour was the son of an Oneida war chief and Madame Mountour, an influential French-Canadian interpreter of mysterious origins; Merrell, Into the American Woods, 25
that “everything here is still so dead,” and the Indians knew nothing but “drinking and dancing.”

Montour’s words were as prescient as they were depressing. Over the course of the next three months, Martin and Anna Mack lived in an almost perpetual state of fear, anxiety, and discomfort. In the evenings, drunken Indians banded together in a “great uproar,” often storming the huts that dotted the river while also “bellow[ing] like cattle.” Mack’s diary entries routinely ended with descriptions of fleeing Montour’s small house – where the missionaries remained throughout their initial time in Shamokin – and spending the night in the brush, only to return tentatively the next day.

A number of moments in Mack’s diary also seemed to illustrate a tension between the white German Moravians and the various Indians that flowed in and out of Shamokin. When a member of a French Indian war party from Canada visited the missionaries at Montour’s hut, he “picked up a large brand from the fire and said he wanted to burn the white people.” After Montour stripped him of this weapon, the Indian went for his flintlock, and then attacked the Macks with a piece of firewood before he was subdued. Similarly, while the Macks were visiting Shikellamy, the main Iroquois representative at Shamokin, a disgruntled native labeled them “pigeons”, or harbingers of an impending “flock” of white settlers to the western side of the Susquehanna River. Fearing for their lives with winter closing in, the Macks left Shamokin and returned to Bethlehem in December of 1745. However, to point to these initial tensions as indicative of the broader Indo-Moravian

67 “Shamokin Diary,” September 17, 1745, [Faull, 3-4]  
68 Ibid  
69 The war parties were likely traveling south to fight in King George’s War (1744-1748).  
70 “Shamokin Diary,” November 12, 1745, [Faull, 26-27]  
71 This fear was likely the product of colonial squatting on Iroquois lands to the east of the Susquehanna. White settlement on Iroquois lands to the east of the river was a recurring source of tension between the Six Nations and the Pennsylvania legislature throughout the 1740s. A treaty between the Six Nations and Pennsylvania in August 1749 would ultimately cede those lands to Pennsylvania in exchange for greater restrictions on western settlement. See August 16, 1749, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 5: 399-340.
relationship at Shamokin ignores how the relationship developed in subsequent years, as well as the impact it had on frontier peace.

One of the Moravians’ primary methods for bringing frontier natives into the *Civitas Indiana-Germana* was economic cooperation, which often involved sending craftsmen to native villages. The best examples of this came from the Moravian mission at Shamokin, which was formally established roughly one year after Mack’s tumultuous visit in 1745. On May 5, 1746, Conrad Weiser – the Pennsylvania negotiator – wrote a letter from Shamokin to Augustus Spangenberg, the Bethlehem-based bishop of the Moravian Church. He said that his wagon had been trapped in a creek for five days near Shamokin because of heavy rainfall, but that there were no craftsmen in the village trained to fix the damage. Weiser reported the incident to Shikellamy, who had requested that Weiser ask Spangenberg for a Moravian blacksmith to live among the Indians. Shikellamy even promised to help the blacksmith construct a log cabin in which to work.\(^\text{72}\) The Moravians were keen to return to the town, believing that the debauchery Mack had witnessed during his trip was a sign that the town was in the grips of Satan, or “the enemy.”\(^\text{73}\) Indeed, Spangenberg had asked Weiser to send a Moravian blacksmith to Shamokin as far back as June of 1745, when they were traveling together to the Iroquois capital of Onondaga.\(^\text{74}\)

In exchange for access to the town, however, the blacksmith would have to repair Indian weaponry, a line that the Pennsylvania government was not immediately prepared to cross.\(^\text{75}\) Indeed, almost two months after speaking with Weiser, Spangenberg received another letter from Charles Brockden, the official recorder of deeds for the Pennsylvania government. Brockden wrote that the


\(^\text{73}\) “Shamokin Diary,” November 2, 1745, [Faull, 15]

\(^\text{74}\) “Spangenberg’s Journey to Onondaga in 1745,” in William Beauchamp, *Moravian Journals Relating to Central New York, 1745-1766*

\(^\text{75}\) Merritt, *At the Crossroads*, 73
Governor was reluctant to permit a Moravian blacksmith to travel to Shamokin before the conclusion of a treaty with the Six Nations against the French in the ongoing colonial war. “His Honour declared That at this Time especially,” Brockden wrote, “It is a Matter of considerable Importance to supply them with a Smith when we know not whether they, the Indians, will take up arms for us or against us.” 76 Ultimately, the treaty with the Indians was concluded at the Albany Conference of 1746, and the governor endorsed a Moravian blacksmith’s journey into Shamokin. 77

The ramifications of this decision were quite clear. Although it was in the service of their missionary ambitions, the Moravians had accepted a politically charged economic assignment that would help to maintain relations with a vital English ally. The blacksmith, Anton Schmidt, arrived in Shamokin in late July of 1747, and his workshop quickly became a hub of activity in Shamokin. 78 Indeed, it was not uncommon for Schmidt to use up all the coal in his forge in a single day, and he would often ask Shikellamy’s sons to bring him more. 79 Although the Shamokin diaries focused almost exclusively on Schmidt’s more quotidian day-to-day tasks, his work in the community had wider ramifications. Mack, for example, recorded that Indians frequently returned from prolonged hunts and had Schmidt repair their flintlock muskets. 80

76 Charles Brockden to Augustus Spangenberg, June 27, 1746, Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 36, reel 6, item 2, http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/RyDa8
77 Charles Brockden to August Spangenberg, Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America November 9, 1746, box 36, reel 6, item 5, http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/RyDa8
78 The missionaries at Shamokin rotated on a roughly yearly basis. Mack, for example, returned to Shekomeko after his trip to Shamokin, and later ministered to Shekomeko’s congregation at the newly constructed Gnadenhutten. “Supplement to the Bethlehem Diary in the Month of August 1747 – Brother Hagen’s Diary of his Work at Shamokin,” July 23, 1747, Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 36, reel 6, item 3, Indigenous Peoples: North America, http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/RvG7X. [Faull, 49]
80 Ibid, November 9, 1747, [Faull, 65]
Shikellamy and other Indian representatives had long demanded that the Pennsylvania government send a craftsman to repair their hunting tools. Indeed, these requests often revolved around colonial-Indian disputes about overhunting and game shortages. In August of 1740, the Delaware chief Sassoonan said in a speech before the Provincial Council that, “Your young Men have killed so many Deer, Beavers, Bears, and Game of all sorts, that we can hardly find any for our selves…I have brought down my Gun and Ax Broken, as we have no Smith living amongst us, and I hope you will get them mended for me.” As game populations plummeted in the face of settler encroachment, having a blacksmith on hand to repair their weapons was the only way Shamokin Indians could hope to feed their families. The Moravian presence in Shamokin therefore helped to delay the eruption of tensions over hunting lands. Furthermore, the importance of the smith apparently endeared the Moravian craftsmen to natives beyond Shamokin. In May of 1750, during a visit to a clan of Nanticoke Indians in the Wyoming Valley, Martin Mack recorded that the Nanticoke were eager for a blacksmith, and requested that the missionaries David Zeisberger and John Frederick Cammerhoff discuss the issue with the Iroquois chiefs during a trip to the capital at Onondaga. Although more documentary evidence exists about Shamokin’s blacksmith, Gnadenhütten’s was also reportedly “famous” among the Delaware Indians. Established in 1747, and rebuilt after a fire in 1751, the blacksmith provided similar gun-repair services to the Indians around the small Moravian hamlet.

Although Moravian craft skills helped alleviate points of tension between natives and whites, their unusual authority among both whites and natives also allowed them to mediate the frontier.
relationship most susceptible to spasms of violence, namely that between Indians and white traders. Here, Shamokin is again an informative example. Much to the chagrin of the Moravians, Indian exchanges with white traders frequently involved alcohol, which remained a persistent plague in Shamokin until the missionaries departed in 1755. The Pennsylvania government had made the first of many futile attempts to prohibit the sale of liquor to the Indians in 1736, when they passed, under pressure from the Six Nations, an act banning traders from “selling Rum and other strong Liquors to the Indians...under the Penalty of their forfeiting Ten Pounds.”\textsuperscript{86} Despite an allusion to the act in a proclamation by Lieutenant Governor George Thomas in May 1745, and subsequent renewal by the legislature in February of 1748, the Shamokin missionaries repeatedly referenced the persistence of the rum trade in their diaries.\textsuperscript{87} The alcoholism of the natives frequently resulted in tense trade interactions. In a letter from Shamokin dated July 9, 1747, Conrad Weiser reported on a trader named John Powle, who had “taken a very fine Gun in pawn from...two Indians for three Gallons of Liquor,” but had refused to return it after the inebriated natives paid for the rum. Rather, he “alleged that he lent it out.” When Weiser called for a local justice of the peace, “he could not do more than order John Powle to pay the Indian the value of the Gun.”\textsuperscript{88}

Incidents like this demonstrated that the Pennsylvania government was unable to exercise its authority over the Indians and whites that traded on the frontier.\textsuperscript{89} As such, unfair trades frequently became sources of violence. On July 10, 1747, a wounded Indian came running into the village with an arrow through his arm, and reported to the Moravians that a “woman and a boy had been shot

\textsuperscript{86} October 9, 1736, \textit{Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania}, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 4: 87
\textsuperscript{89} Recall White’s concept of a middle ground, within which neither party has the preponderance of power required to impose its will upon the other.
with arrows by the *Wilden* [Moravian term for Indians].” 90 Indeed, inebriated buyers and predatory sellers seldom made a peaceful combination, and the Shamokin Indians openly distrusted white traders. If the traders’ behavior around the settlement did not earn this distrust, their actions within the town certainly did. When two traders started a fight over who could rightfully trade with the Shamokin natives, calling each other “many shameful names that they could think and finally both beat[ing] each other’s heads bloody,” Shikellamy lamented in Oneida that “traders are not good men!” 91 In this power vacuum, the Moravians were one of the few groups capable of preventing outbreaks of violence between the two parties. For example, the Shamokin diaries described how the Moravians housed traders, even those selling liquor, to prevent them from fighting with the natives. In an entry from January of 1750, David Zeisberger noted that four traders had arrived in Shamokin and gotten into an argument with the local Delaware tribesmen. “Three of them came to our door in the night as we were already sleeping and asked that we allow them to come in and sleep the night in our house,” Zeisberger wrote, “They could not stay together. We allowed them to spend the night there then.” 92

Indians along the Susquehanna River also seemed aware of the fact that an alliance with the Moravians, rather than exploitative traders, provided reliable access to European trade goods. Indeed, as Katherine Engel and Amy Schutt have pointed out in their work, a partnership with the Moravians meant access to European trade goods without having to sacrifice too much of one’s native culture, especially given the light-handedness of Moravian missionary tactics. 93 The Shamokin blacksmith was certainly the most notable example of this relationship, but the Shamokin diaries illustrated a number of smaller ones. When the Moravians gave food to a Mohican woman who had

90 “Shamokin Diary,” July 10, 1747, [Faull, 47]
91 “Shamokin Diary,” June 28, 1748 [Faull, 123]
92 “Shamokin Diary,” January 18, 1750 [Faull, 188]
been a routine visitor to their homes, other Indians were jealous of her relationship with the white Moravians. “You are more loved by the white people than we are,” some Shamokin Indians said, according to the woman, “One can see that you are one of their friends or from a nation that they love.” 94 Another Nanticoke Indian who came to Martin Mack asked for bread for his children, saying they were “crying out for white people’s bread.” 95

Beyond economic transactions, the Moravians also entered into more formal alliances with native tribes, often with the effect of staving off violence between natives and the government. These moves obviously served the Moravians insofar as they ensured good relationships with potential converts, thereby providing the stability required for a religious state in the mid-Atlantic colonies. However, alliances also played into the hands of the tribes, especially those facing migratory pressure from white settlers squatting on their lands. The most prominent example of this was the 1750 alliance between the Gnadenhütten Moravians and the Delaware sachem Teedyuscung. In order to understand this alliance in context, however, we must briefly discuss Teedyuscung’s past attempts to combat the western migration of the Delaware tribe.

Teedyuscung was a primary victim of the infamous Walking Purchase of 1737. (See Figure 6 in the Appendix). In the early 1730s, the proprietors of Pennsylvania dug up a possibly falsified deed to the land of Delaware tribesmen in the Lehigh Valley. The terms of the sale, dated 1700, allegedly “set forth the tract’s northward extent as the distance a man could walk in a day and a half, following the course of the river.” In order to maximize their gain, the proprietors hired trained runners to travel a previously cleared path, thereby laying claim to all the territory between the Delaware and Lehigh Rivers. 96 Teedyuscung lived just north of the Walking Purchase line, but the same could not

94 “Shamokin Diary,” November 23, 1747 [Faull, 70]
95 “Shamokin Diary,” May 20, 1748 [Faull, 117]
be said for his half-brother Captain John.\textsuperscript{97} In 1742, the two Delawares requested an audience with Governor Thomas of Pennsylvania, saying that they, “having embraced the Christian Religion,” were “desirous of living under the same Laws with the English.”\textsuperscript{98} However, after the governor pressed them on specific details about their conversion to Presbyterianism, they were unable to prove their commitment to the faith, and Teedyuscung’s relatives were forced west. By 1749, the land sales caught up to Teedyuscung himself. The Six Nations sold a large tract of land north of the Blue Mountains, including a town at the head of the Lehigh River called Meniolagomekah, which was Teedyuscung’s home village. This time, however, Teedyuscung acted quickly to remain on his land. On March 12, 1750, he was baptized into the Moravian Church at Gnadenhütten, with the attending bishop crowing that he had baptized “the chief among sinners.”\textsuperscript{99}

Teedyuscung’s actual commitment to the Church was shaky at best, with the missionaries noting that he was “unstable as water and like a reed shaken before the wind.”\textsuperscript{100} However, his baptism into the Church was a shrewd political maneuver meant to forestall a conflict with the Pennsylvania government. The baptism transformed the town of Meniolagomekah into a Moravian settlement, populated by converted and unconverted Indians alike. Although Teedyuscung lived at Gnadenhütten, his conversion allowed the Delaware Indians who remained at Meniolagomekah to receive protection and supplies from the Moravians. The Moravian missionary Bernhard Grube – the minister at Meniolagomekah in May and June of 1752 – described how the Indians at the settlement hunted with the missionaries, shared crops, and consumed supplies delivered by

\textsuperscript{97} Ironically, Captain John lived on a tract of land that the Moravians acquired in order to construct their settlement at Nazareth. For details, see Kenneth Hamilton, ed., \textit{The Bethlehem Diary}, 31-129.
\textsuperscript{99} Wallace, 39-40
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid
Moravian-owned ships in New York. In a May 25 entry, Grube happily noted that the Moravian ship *Irene* had arrived in port, a development that meant supplies for local Indians facing a poor harvest. Although Teedyuscung eventually took up arms against the Pennsylvania government—a topic we will discuss in the following chapter—his alliance with the Moravians temporarily forestalled a conflict over land sales with the Pennsylvania government.

Moravian alliances also helped to ensure tribal survival during times of shortage and famine. Indians clearly understood the church’s frontier mission towns as sources of refuge and resupply. Indeed, the best-documented conference in the Moravian records took place in the spring of 1752 between the Moravians and representatives of the Shawnee and Nanticoke tribes. The records of the meeting, which included the exchange of wampum strings and many of the other formalized trappings of eighteenth-century Indo-European diplomacy, provide a wealth of information about how Indians leveraged alliances with the Moravians to maintain supply chains even during difficult times. In the first few days of the conference, the Nanticoke negotiators said they were facing “great hunger” as a result of a crop failure, while the Moravians directly acknowledged the “poverty” of the Shawnee and offered them 50 bushels of flour. As a parting gift, the negotiators received an additional sixty bushels of flour, as well as 80 pounds of tobacco and baskets of bread and meat. Much like the Delaware, the Shawnees and Nanticokes recognized Moravian mission towns were

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102 Ibid, May 24-25
103 Hertrampf, 182-183
vital sources of supply, and were therefore less likely to react violently when confronted with famine or game shortages brought about by white settlement and overhunting.105

Through their economic and cultural negotiations with frontier natives, Moravians established an imperial buffer on the Pennsylvania frontier. During their time in settlements like Shamokin and Gnadenhütten, they provided valuable economic services, mediated relationships with traders, and engaged in political alliances with various tribes like the Delaware and Shawnee. But in spite of all these efforts, the Moravians continued to insist throughout the late 1740s and early 1750s that they were uninterested in civil affairs. In June of 1752, Moravian bishop Joseph Spangenberg met with Pennsylvania Lieutenant Governor James Hamilton, in order to address allegations that his missionaries had intrigued with the French to sell English land to the Six Nations during their 1752 trip to Onondaga. During the meeting, Spangenberg did not mince words about his purported distaste for colonial politics. Far from intriguing with the French to sell English lands to the Six Nations, Spangenberg told the governor that an alliance with Catholics would “ruin our whole Work among [the Indians].” The Moravians, he insisted, had an “established Maxim” not to “intermeddle in any Thing of that King, believing it prejudicial to our Main [goal] of preaching the Gospel.”106

The irony of the situation was lost on Spangenberg. Despite their theological inclinations and purported resentment for civil affairs, the Moravians’ cordial relationship with natives had landed them in the office of the governor of Pennsylvania. And as the storm clouds of war began to gather on the horizon in 1753, and the Six Nations began to reassert their authority over tribes that had allied themselves with the Moravians, the church would only entangle itself further in civil affairs. As long as they continued to reside on Pennsylvania’s precarious western frontier, Moravian

105 See Hertrampf, 183
106 “Hermann and Rogers, Report; June 17, 1752,” Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 40, reel 34, folder 1, item 3, Indigenous Peoples: North America
contact with Indians would inevitably pull them into the competition for imperial sovereignty in North America.

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Chapter III: “A Future Harvest” – Moravians as Government Agents, 1753-1762

In July of 1758, the Moravian missionary Christian Frederick Post met with delegations of Shawnee and Delaware Indians on the banks of the Ohio River. In his speech to the Indians, Post spoke not only as a missionary, but also as an agent of the English government. “Come away on this side of the mountain,” Post beseeched the French-allied Indians, “where may oftener converse together, and where your own flesh and blood lives.”

Through his language of kinship, of a common ancestry between the Indians and their English counterparts, Post was attempting to pry the Indians away from their French benefactors in the west. Post’s mission, carried out with the authority of the Pennsylvania government, represented the conclusion of the Moravians’ political adaptation. In three short years following Spangenberg’s 1752 pronouncement, members of the church had gone from avowed political neutrals to active government agents, conducting diplomatic and intelligence missions for a colonial government caught in the middle of the Seven Years War.

The eruption of the imperial war between Britain and France in 1754 sparked attacks on frontier settlements by Delaware and Shawnee Indians, who saw an opportunity to reclaim past land holdings against the will of the Iroquois Confederacy. When Gnadenhütten – the Moravian settlement discussed earlier in this paper – fell to the Indian raiders in November of 1755, the Moravians threw themselves into the service of the Pennsylvania government. This was partially

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108 Post’s language during the negotiations also drew on established diplomatic customs between Indians and Pennsylvania. English negotiators often noted that proprietor William Penn, through his “benevolent” treatment of the Indians, had brought the natives and settlers together into a symbolic family. Indeed, the natives often referred to Penn and his successors as “Brother Onas” in discussions with Pennsylvania go-between. For a comprehensive discussion of Penn’s discursive legacy in Pennsylvania diplomacy, see James O’Neil Spady, “Colonialism and Discursive Antecedents of Penn’s Treaty with the Indians,” in Pencak and Richter, *Friends and Enemies in Penn’s Woods: Indians, Colonialists, and the Racial Construction of Pennsylvania*, 18-41.

109 Although this topic has received passing reference in general histories of the Moravians, the only specific treatment in the secondary literature comes from Jared Burkholder, “Neither ‘Kriegerisch’ nor ‘Quäkerisch’: Moravians and the Question of Violence in Eighteenth Century Pennsylvania,” *Journal of Moravian History* 12:2 (Fall 2012), 143-169. Burkholder’s analysis, however, mainly confronts questions of Moravian theology rather than their specific diplomatic and intelligence actions.
because the Moravians feared the oppressive “Tyranny of Popery” that a French victory promised.\textsuperscript{110} However, as Katherine Engel has correctly pointed out, continued access to the British Atlantic trade was also essential for funding the Moravian missionary effort.\textsuperscript{111} As a result, the Moravians not only provided intelligence to the government, but also negotiated tensions between whites and Indians fleeing the fighting, and were eventually instrumental in securing peace with the French-allied Delaware Indians of the Ohio Valley. Ultimately, restoring peace to the “Province, where we have enjoyed peace for several years past,” would mean renewing the dream of a \textit{Civitas Indiana-Germana}, the utopia that the Moravians had worked so hard to establish.\textsuperscript{112}

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The immediate origins of Moravian involvement in the Seven Years’ War can be traced to conferences with local natives in 1753 and 1754. In March of 1753, Indians from the Delaware, Shawnee, and Nanticoke tribes – the same tribes with whom the Moravians had forged alliances – began soliciting the Christian Indians at Gnadenhütten to move to a new Indian settlement in the Wyoming Valley. The town diary recorded the arrival of 22 Indians led by three Iroquois chiefs, who ordered the Indians to leave for the new settlement.\textsuperscript{113} One month later, at a conference in Bethlehem, Abraham – a Mohican who was among the first Indian converts at Shekomeko – announced that his tribe had named him a captain and requested that he join them at Wyoming.\textsuperscript{114} In the wampum strings he laid before the council, Abraham cited his desire to see his Mohican

\textsuperscript{110} “Hermann and Rogers, Report; June 17, 1752,” \textit{Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America}, box 40, reel 34, folder 1, item 3, Indigenous Peoples: North America
\textsuperscript{112} “Spangenberg to Gov. Denny, November 29, 1756,” \textit{Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America}, box 40, reel 34, folder 2, item 10, Indigenous Peoples: North America
\textsuperscript{113} Cited in Earl P. Olmstead, \textit{David Zeisberger: A Life Among the Indians}, (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1997), 71
\textsuperscript{114} For background on Abraham, see the following comprehensive treatment of the Shekomeko conversion efforts: Rachel Wheeler, \textit{To Live Upon Hope: Mohicans and Missionaries in the Eighteenth-Century Northeast}, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 67-72
brethren, as well as “meine Freunde die Nantikoks, Schawanoks, und Delaware.”\textsuperscript{115} The missionaries at Gnadenhütten would later express grave concerns about the proposal, stating in an October 1753 conference that the “translocation” of the tribes would threaten the foundational principles of Zinzendorf’s original plan.\textsuperscript{116} Irrespective of Moravian misgivings, the same rhetoric of inter-tribal friendship emerged in November of 1754, when the Delaware sachem Teedyuscung returned to Gnadenhütten with the Shawnee chief Paxinos, and again requested that “meine Freunde die Shawnees, Mahikander und Delawars” come west the settlement in the Wyoming Valley.\textsuperscript{117} (See the north-south trajectory of the Susquehanna River in Figure 1 for the location of the Wyoming Valley).

Despite the friendly rhetoric the Indian envoys used, the proposal to move Indians to the Wyoming Valley was nothing more than Iroquois political maneuvering. The Six Nations saw the valley as the “strategic gateway to the Iroquois heartland,” and feared the encroachment of white settlers from Pennsylvania and Connecticut. Indeed, as Governor Hamilton noted in a March 1754 letter, the steady flow of white migrants to the valley “highly offended” the Six Nations. Fearing the British, they sent envoys to the Moravian settlement to drive Indians into the valley, and thereby establish a buffer between themselves and the expansionist Euroamerican colonies.\textsuperscript{118} The Albany Congress of 1754, which aimed to improve English relations with native tribes amid mounting tensions with the French settlers to the west, made the situation even worse. Iroquois representatives, without consulting the impacted tribes – most notably the Delaware – ceded large tracts of land on the Susquehanna and Delaware Rivers to the Connecticut-based Susquehanna

\textsuperscript{115} “Ich bin 7 Jahr wie ein Kind herumgegangen und habe keine Chiefs gehabt und habe euch meine Freunde auch nicht gesehen.” Gnadenhütten Diary, Jan. 1 – Dec. 31, 1753
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, October 13, 1753
\textsuperscript{117} “Gnadenhütten Diary, July 1 – Dec. 31, 1754”
Company, while also handing over a deed to representatives of the Pennsylvania government.\footnote{For the minutes of the Albany Congress, see June 19 – July 11, 1754, \textit{Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania}, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 6: 57-133; Also see Moyer, \textit{Wild Yankees}, 18-21 for brief overview of negotiations related to the Wyoming Valley.} Although this double-dealing produced a long period of uncertainty over which colony actually owned the ceded land, what ultimately mattered was that the Iroquois had pushed subject tribes off their land and into the Wyoming Valley without consent. This had particular significance for the Delaware tribesmen led by Teedyuscung, who had already seen their tribe splinter after the infamous Walking Purchase of 1737, because the land deal forced them out of the Meniolagomekah settlement that they had maintained through their alliance with the Moravians.

Furthermore, the move represented an Iroquois attempt to reassert authority over the tribes they claimed to control. This was especially true for the Delaware under Teedyuscung. Indeed, when the Delaware refused to vacate the Walking Purchase lands in the early 1740s, the Iroquois publicly chastised them in a meeting of the Provincial Council, saying “[w]e conquered You, we made Women of you, you know you are Women, and can sell no more Land than Women.”\footnote{July 12, 1742, \textit{Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania}, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 4: 579} As Jane Merritt has argued, however, the alliances that the Delaware and other tribes forged with Moravians and other European settlers distanced them from the control of the Iroquois. They no longer depended exclusively on their powerful “uncles” for food, protection, or political support.\footnote{Merritt, \textit{At the Crossroads}, 6-7} By moving them to the Wyoming Valley, the Iroquois sought to legitimize their control over these disaffected tribes.

Discontented Indians, many of whom claimed lands to the east, flooded into the Wyoming Valley as a result of similar Iroquois maneuvers. The valley was now a powder keg. All that was needed was something to light the fuse. The Seven Years War served that purpose admirably. The conflict began after years of tense negotiations between the English and French over the
construction of French forts in the Ohio River Valley, which the English feared would be “everlasting Goads in our sides” subjecting their colonists to continued “Outrages, Murders, Rapines, and Cruelties.” 122 The French, however, maintained that they were the rightful masters of the Ohio territories. As the Governor-General of Canada put it in an August 1751 letter to New York governor George Clinton, the French were the “first whites” to explore the territory of the Six Nations in Ohio, and therefore held sole military and economic claim to the lands. 123 Although a complete overview of the negotiations surrounding the outbreak of the war is beyond the scope of this paper, similar disputes continued throughout the early 1750s.

The tensions between Britain and France reached their zenith in July of 1755 with the rout of General Edward Braddock’s expedition against Fort Duquesne (near modern-day Pittsburgh). In what proved to be a prescient speech, Lieutenant Governor Morris lamented to the legislature that the colony had been “left exposed to the cruel Incursions of the French and their barbarous Indians who delight in shedding human blood.” Sure enough, by November of 1755, Morris wrote to General Sir William Johnson that “the unhappy defeat of General Braddock has brought an Indian War…from a Quarter here it was least expected, I mean the Delaware and the Shawonese.” 124 Indeed, Braddock’s defeat led to the defection of not only the Ohio Delawares, but also the Delawares at Wyoming under the leadership of Teedyuscung and the Delaware sachem Shingas.

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122 February 13, 1754, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 5: 720
123 “En Effet Monsieur, vous n’ignorez pas et les Histoires Anciennes et modernes en font foi, que les François sont les premiers Blancs qui ayent paru sur les terres des Cinq Nations c’est avec eux qu’ils se sont d’abord liez d’amitie c’est deux qu’ils ont recu leurs premiers Secours aussi des ce moment ont ils nomme les Français leurs Peres,” [spelling from original document maintained], 10 August, 1751, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 5: 559-562
124 November 14, 1755, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 6: 697-700; Morris uses “unexpected” here because previous negotiations with Delaware sachems from the Susquehanna and Ohio regions – prior to Braddock’s defeat – had strengthened the alliance between the English and Delaware. For the most recent example, see April 16, 1755, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 6: 360-363, in which the Delaware sachem Tatenscung says, “The Covenant of Friendship made by our Fathers and Grandfathers and their Unles the Six Nations with the English, is bound so fast by a Chain about arms that let happen what will We will not break loose, but be united and stand firm to each other forever.”
This defection had particular significance for the Moravians, because these natives saw violence as more than just an opportunity to reclaim their lands. Rather, as Jane Merritt has shown, “Through violence, they sought to sever the ties to individuals or families who had ignored the obligations that years of personal and economic alliances entailed.” Despite economic and political alliances with the Delaware and other tribes in the late 1740s and early 1750s, the Moravians had been unable to prevent the Iroquois from forcing tribes off their land. Ironically, their relationships with other tribes had provided an incentive for the Iroquois to order resettlement. The raid on Gnadenhütten, therefore, was the ironic end-result of Moravian efforts to keep peace between whites and natives before the war. Intimacy with the Delaware and Shawnee had prompted the Iroquois to reassert their authority, leading to violent reactions as the Delaware in particular attempted to “shew the Six Nations that they are no longer Women.” The Moravians seemed tragically aware of this fact before the destruction of Gnadenhütten. A January 1755 entry in the Gnadenhütten town diary references a meeting at which Moravian leaders, including Spangenberg, considered severing political ties with local tribes over which the Iroquois claimed sovereignty.

Over the course of the next two years, Delaware and Shawnee raiders killed at least 326 white settlers on the frontier, and took another 125 captive. (See Figure 7 in the Appendix for a map of frontier raids in Pennsylvania). The eleven Moravians killed on the night of November 24, 1755 at Gnadenhütten were among the first to fall in these raids. Their deaths, however, brought about a new era of Moravian political action. Over the next five years, the Moravians provided sanctuary for whites and Indians fleeing the frontier raids, and opened up political channels with the government of Pennsylvania in order to supply the refugees. They also provided information on

125 Merritt, *At the Crossroads*, 177
127 January 10, 1755, “Gnadenhütten Diary, July 1 – Dec. 31, 1755”
128 Ibid
military matters, frequently updating the government on raids and the movements of French troops and their allies. Finally, they used their social capital to act as frontier negotiators during diplomatic envoys to the Susquehanna and Ohio Delaware. Indeed, the Moravians abandoned any pretense of isolationism, instead using government involvement as a means to an end. As Spangenberg wrote in a letter dated December 23, 1755, one month after the fall of Gnadenhütten, “We are of the opinion that governments ought to protect their subjects. Rulers are Servants of God, and the sword is given them by a Superior Power.”

This chapter examines all three Moravian contributions to the British war effort in turn.

As war raged on the Pennsylvania frontier, Bethlehem became a primary destination for converts and Indian refugees alike. As winter approached near the end of 1756, Spangenberg wrote a hasty letter to newly appointed Pennsylvania Governor William Denny, noting that refugees were continuing to pour “out of the Woods” and into Bethlehem. “They are very troublesome Guests,” Spangenberg wrote in his letter, “Our Houses are full already, and we must be at the Expences of building Winter-houses for them…” In the few years after the fall of Gnadenhütten, however, the bishop would deftly manipulate the government to keep supplies flowing to the Christian Indian refugees of Bethlehem. Spangenberg sent the initial request for material support from the Pennsylvania government on behalf of the Gnadenhütten Indians on November 30, 1755. In the petition, the Indians – whose words Moravian scribes were monitoring and transcribing – noted that the missionaries had “told us Words from Jesus Christ our God and Lord, who became a Man for us and purchased Salvation for us with his Blood.” Because they had been brought to God under the careful watch of the Pennsylvanians, the Indians remarked that they were “entirely devoted to

129 Cited in Reichel, *Memorials of the Moravian Church*, 197; For more background on Moravian theology as it pertains to wartime action, see Burkholder, “Neither ‘Kriegerisch’ nor ‘Quäkerisch’”

the English government.”\textsuperscript{131} The strategy ultimately paid dividends. In his response to the petition, Lieutenant Governor Morris wrote that the Indians’ religious conversion entitled them to the “same Protection as to the other Subjects of his Majesty.”\textsuperscript{132} In January of the following year, Spangenberg wrote a letter to a sympathetic Benjamin Franklin – whom the legislature had appointed to handle the Bethlehem refugees – asking for supplies for the refugees. Franklin wrote that because the Christian Indians “are in real Necessity,” they should be supplied with “Meal and Meat, and I will pay any reasonable Account of yours for that Service.”\textsuperscript{133}

Spangenberg’s real talent, however, was manipulating colonial fears about Indian defections to the French and their allies. In a May 10, 1757 petition to a government representative, he demanded additional state support for the Christian Indians, noting that the Moravian Church had already contributed in excess of two hundred pounds sterling toward the maintenance of the converts. In the conclusion of the letter, he suggested that a shortage of state funds at Bethlehem could leave the impression that “the Province does not care to pay any more for you, so you must shift for yourself…Will [the converts] not think, then the Murdering Indians are better cared for than We, who have proved faithful to the English…?”\textsuperscript{134} He repeated this position in a July 1758 petition to Governor Denny, arguing that the refugees could not safely leave Bethlehem for villages on the Susquehanna River until the war was over. “For they know,” he wrote, “that they will be forced to take up arms with [the French] against the English Government, if the Troubles of War

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{131} “Petition to Lieutenant Governor Morris from the Gnadenhütten Indians, November 30, 1755” Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 40, reel 34, item 7a, Indigenous Peoples: North America
\item \textsuperscript{132} “Response of Lieutenant Governor Morris to the Indians, December 4, 1755,” Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 40, reel 34, item 8, Indigenous Peoples: North America
\item \textsuperscript{133} “Franklin to Spangenberg, January 30, 1756,” Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 40, reel 34, item 1, Indigenous Peoples: North America
\item \textsuperscript{134} “Spangenberg to Fox, May 10, 1757,” Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 40, reel 34, item 2, Indigenous Peoples: North America
\end{itemize}
should continue as they probably will.” Thus, the seemingly apolitical Spangenberg was able to continuously secure state support for his battered Christian Indian congregation through a series of shrewd political maneuvers.

In addition, Spangenberg was keenly aware of the racial tensions within the refugee settlement, a byproduct of the rampant violence on the frontier. Many of the white families that had fallen prey to frontier violence frequently associated English-allied Indians with the raiders that had killed their family members, threatening to provoke violent conflicts within Bethlehem. Indeed, as Conrad Weiser pointed out in a meeting of the Pennsylvania legislature, “our People are very malicious against Our Indians; they curse and damn ‘em to their Faces and say, ‘must we Feed you [wives and children] and your husbands fight in the meantime for the French, etc.” Similarly, in the same November letter to Denny that outlined the scale of the refugee problem at Bethlehem, Spangenberg wrote that “some of our Neighbours are very uneasy at our receiving such murdering Indians; for so they call them.” The government ultimately granted permission for Bethlehem to set a night watch that could monitor potential violence. However, Spangenberg was also aware that some suspicions could not be controlled, and he would occasionally dangle the possibility of disorder within the camp as a justification for moving one of his converts to the safer confines of Philadelphia. When there was a “Rage in the neighborhood” against Moravian elder Nicodemus’s residence at Bethlehem, for example, Spangenberg requested that Nicodemus be moved to Philadelphia, thereby preventing “Mischief” that could “breed evil consequences.” Therefore, by manipulating colonial fears of losing Indian allies through racial tension, or of facing tumults within

135 “Spangenberg Petition to Denny, July 4, 1758,” Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 40, reel 34, item 5, Indigenous Peoples: North America
136 Cited in Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 195
137 “Spangenberg to Denny, November 29, 1756,” Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 40, reel 34, item 10, Indigenous Peoples: North America
139 June 28, 1756, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 7: 173
their own refugee camps, Spangenberg had been able to create a safer environment for his Christian Indian converts.

As a result of their management of refugee centers at Bethlehem and Nazareth, as well as their knowledge of Indian languages, the Moravians became essential sources of news and military information for the Pennsylvania government. Indeed, on December 16, 1755, less than four weeks after the massacre at Gnadenhütten, the prominent Bethlehem resident Timothy Horsfield delivered two letters from Spangenberg – both dated December 11\textsuperscript{th} – to the provincial assembly in Philadelphia. In the letters, Spangenberg writes in vivid detail about an attack on “Broadhead’s Plantation” by an estimated force of 200 Indians, which forced a number of families to flee east toward Nazareth. After describing the attack based on eyewitness accounts from members of the “Broadhead’s, Culvers, McMichael’s,” and all other families from the attacked plantation, Spangenberg requested advice from Philadelphia about “what to do in this present Situation & Circumstances.”  \textsuperscript{140}

The Moravians had proven their worth in intelligence gathering even before the fall of Gnadenhütten. The papers of Timothy Horsfield clearly illustrated this point. The prominent Bethlehem resident, who worked in town as a butcher but was not a Moravian disciple, recorded the testimony of missionaries Christian Seidel and David Zeisberger after they witnessed an attack by French Mohawk Indians near the Susquehanna River on October 20, 1755. Less than two weeks afterward, he recorded Zeisberger’s testimony about an attack that took place on October 26, 1755. \textsuperscript{141} Both of these dispatches were later sent to Pennsylvania government officials. But Zeisberger was not the only missionary who reported attacks and provided military intelligence. In the instructions regarding his mission to the Ohio Delawares, the government asked Moravian

\textsuperscript{140} December 16, 1755, \textit{Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania}, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 6: 756-757
\textsuperscript{141} “Deposition of Christian Seidel and David Zeisberger, November 10, 1755,” and “Deposition of David Zeisberger, November 22, 1755,” \textit{Timothy Horsfield Papers}, American Philosophical Society
missionary Christian Frederick Post to provide information on French and Indian military strength. Although we will return to Post slightly later, it is worth mentioning that in the journal he submitted to the Provincial Council after his July 1758 expedition, he described the strength of the force manning Fort Duquesne, the linchpin of French military emplacements in the Ohio territories. Post further suggested that the French-Indian force, which he warned was “a full three thousand French and Indians,” might lay in ambush for General John Forbes’ upcoming British expedition force.¹⁴²

The final area in which the Moravians contributed to the English war effort involved direct diplomatic negotiations. Here, it is important to recall the distinction between the Delaware combatants during the war. Despite past peace treaties with the English, both the Susquehanna Delawares – based mostly out of the Wyoming Valley and led by Teedyuscung and King Shingas – and the Ohio Delawares, who had moved west after the Walking Purchase of 1737, were allied with the French against the English during the initial stages of the war. As a result, Pennsylvania declared war against the Delaware on April 14, 1756, citing their violation of “most Solemn Treaties,” and their “cruel, savage, and perfidious Manner” in wartime.¹⁴³

However, less than two weeks later, the Pennsylvania legislature began to discuss dispatching a peace delegation to the Susquehanna Delawares. And although he had rarely shown his face at previous meetings of the Provincial Council, Spangenberg was invited to attend the session. Newcastle, an Iroquois representative and mediator between Pennsylvania and the Delaware, agreed to make a journey to the Wyoming Valley with a group of other natives. Governor Morris, however, had another idea. According to the minutes of that April 26 meeting, “The Governor…then told them that Mr. Spangenberg was desired to be present, having some Delaware Indians under his care, that he might hear what was delivered to them. He desir’d that they wou’d go by way of Bethlehem, and take with them one or more of the Indians there, and that Mr. Spangenberg would prepare

¹⁴² Post, 230-1
¹⁴³ April 14, 1756, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 7: 88
those Indians for their visit, and persuade some of them to accompany them to [Wyoming].”\textsuperscript{144}

Here, the importance of Spangenberg and the Moravians to the colonial government became clear. Morris tried to insert into the negotiating team an Indian representative who was directly accountable to him, rather than the Six Nations. In essence, he asked that Spangenberg appoint his own representative to the negotiating team, one loyal to Spangenberg and therefore to the Pennsylvania government.

After arriving in Bethlehem on April 28, Spangenberg wrote a letter to Morris, informing him that a Delaware named Augustus had “upon Serious Considerations, resolved upon going” with the other envoys.\textsuperscript{145} The choice was not coincidental; Augustus was the brother-in-law of Teedyuscung, the rebellious Delaware sachem who had defected to the French in 1755. Almost a month later, after the delegation returned from their journey to Wyoming, Spangenberg authored a lengthy 16-point letter to Morris, outlining Augustus’s chief recollections from the conference. His points included details on Indian movements in the Susquehanna River Valley, a note on the well-provisioned French Indian forces, and a description of a wampum exchange in which the Six Nations guaranteed security for the Delawares if they agreed to switch sides to the English.\textsuperscript{146} The diplomatic encounter with his brother-in-law, along with the assurance of Iroquois security, helped bring Teedyuscung to the table. In conferences at Easton in 1756 and 1757, Teedyuscung and the Pennsylvania government negotiated a peace, wherein Teedyuscung would cease hostilities in exchange for a tract of land in the Wyoming Valley that “shall not be lawful for us or our Children ever to sell, nor for you or any of your Children ever to buy.”\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{144} April 26, 1756, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 7: 109
\textsuperscript{145} “Spangenberg to Morris, May 2, 1756,” Records of the Moravian Mission Among the Indians of North America, box 40, reel 34, item 5, Indigenous Peoples: North America
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, item 10
\textsuperscript{147} July 25, 1757, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 7: 678
The most notable Moravian negotiator of the colonial period, Christian Frederick Post, emerged to maintain this tenuous peace.\textsuperscript{148} With the eastern threat now solved, the British shifted their attention to the Ohio Delaware, and in 1758 began massing a military expedition to strike the French and their Indian allies in the west. (For geographical context of Post’s westward journey, see Figure 8 in the Appendix). However, the marshaling of a large English conventional force, as well as the mobilization of southern Cherokee Indians to participate in the invasion, fostered deep suspicion along the Susquehanna. Indeed, in testimony delivered to the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania on June 5, 1758, a Mohican Indian named Benjamin described a conversation with an Indian elder who said “the English had very bad Designs against the Indians, and those who did not fly from the Susquehanna would all be murdered.”\textsuperscript{149} In response to this growing concern, Governor Denny drafted a series of messages to the Susquehanna Indians, reassuring them that the army was only intended for French forces and asking them to help their Ohio-based relatives to defect before the army’s arrival. When Post – a man that the minutes of the council meeting describe as “well acquainted with the Susquehanna Indians and [knowledgeable about] the Delaware Language” – learned of the Council’s plans, he approached them and “kindly offered his Service to carry them, which was accepted.”\textsuperscript{150} The fact that Post volunteered for this task without being approached by the Provincial Council was quite significant. Post had the political awareness to understand that the maintenance of peace – and thereby the protections of current and future Moravian operations – depended on shoring up the western frontier. This was not a reluctant decision by an apolitical hermit, but rather a calculated choice made according to the political realities of the time.

\textsuperscript{148} The best overview of Post’s life and missionary work among the Indians of North America comes from Thomas Christopher Chase, \textit{Christian Frederick Post, 1715-1785: Missionary and Diplomat to the Indians of North America}, (unpublished doctoral dissertation) The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, 51-144
\textsuperscript{149} June 5, 1758, \textit{Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania}, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 8: 131
\textsuperscript{150} June 22, 1758, \textit{Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania}, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 8: 139
Post’s willingness to go forth among the Susquehanna Indians was a springboard for his most consequential expedition, which he undertook in July of 1758 to bring the Ohio Indians back into the English fold. Over the course of this expedition, Post referenced the usefulness of his personal, missionary-based relationships with the Ohio Indians, which his journals suggested were essential for encouraging the Ohio Indians to negotiate a peace treaty at Easton in 1758. In fact, the Provincial Council selected Post over more established negotiators like Conrad Weiser and George Croghan because he commanded a respect among the Delaware and Shawnee that the other two did not. The natives were suspicious of Croghan’s past land dealings, and Weiser was a colonel in the colonial militia with close ties to Iroquois headmen that Teedyuscung vehemently distrusted.151

Upon arriving in a small Indian town on the River Conaquonashon, Post met with “some Shawanese, that used to live at Wyoming,” who knew him from his missionary work and received him kindly. Later that day, Post also encountered the Ohio Delaware leader Delaware George. Delaware George had been a disciple of Post’s at Gnadenhütten, and upon meeting with him announced that he had “not slept all night, so much had he been engaged with my coming.”152 Post’s diaries indicated that the Indians were kind to him, proclaiming that when he went before the French at Fort Duquesne to announce his message, they would “carry me in their bosoms,” an Indian term for ensuring one’s safety.153 Post was also able to appeal to a shared religious or missionary background when allaying some of the deeper concerns of the Ohio Indians. When Delaware George, along with Shingas and the Shawnee leader King Beaver, asked Post whether the British and French intended to join forces against the Ohio Indians and divide their land, Post swore an oath, “before God, that the English never did, nor never will, join with the French to destroy

151 Chase, 57-58
152 Post, 193-195
153 Post, 201
you.”

Luckily for Post, a number of factors were already conspiring to turn the Ohio Indians against their French allies, including poor supplies, fear of the British expedition, and widespread famine as young men abandoned the harvest and went off to fight. His expedition was ultimately successful, and ten weeks after the Ohio Indians had agreed to discuss peace with the English colonies, the Ohio Indians signed the Treaty of Easton in October of 1758. In exchange for ceasing their alliance with the French, the Native American delegates received large blocks of land from Pennsylvania; colonial recognition of their hunting rights in the Ohio River Valley; and the assurance that the colonies would not settle west of the Allegheny Mountains after the end of the war.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of Post’s diplomatic missions, however, was their religious purpose. Indeed, prior to embarking on his July 1758 expedition, Post wrote that the journey “would be as much for the Indians as the English…it would be the means of saving the lives of many hundreds of Indians.” In his concluding remarks, at the end of a lengthy passage praising and thanking God for safe passage, Post thanks the Lord for bringing him “through the country of dreadful jealousy and mistrust, where the prince of this world [Satan] has his rule and government over the children of disobedience.”

Governor Denny, who worked closely with Post, also understood Post’s work as religiously motivated. In 1759, Denny wrote a letter approving Post’s request for a passport to preach among the Ohio Indians. In the letter, he wrote that although Post’s diplomatic commissions would have seemed uncharacteristic for a Moravian missionary, “he yielded thereto on its being argued that the bringing about a Peace with the Indians would open the Way for

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154 Post, 222-223
155 For a more comprehensive discussion of the factors turning the Ohio Indians away from the French, see Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774, (New York: Michael Norman, 1993), 124-129
156 Post, 219; Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Theo. Fenn & Co.), 8: 175-210
157 Ibid
158 Post, 188
159 Post, 232
the Servants of God to look for a future harvest.” Post corroborated this in 1760, when he wrote a letter to Governor Hamilton requesting that the legislature stand behind any promise he made at an upcoming meeting with the Susquehanna Indians. A man of God, he wrote, “ought to be somewhat more cautious than others in carrying to the same People worldly messages, as these latter are often unforeseen Disappointments.” If the Indians began to distrust him on political issues, they may not trust him on religious ones either. Post believed his political mission was ultimately a religious one. The maintenance of the state was the maintenance of the Church, which was itself the maintenance of a future religious utopia.

The Seven Years War therefore marked the conclusion of the Moravians’ political adaptation. The same group whose obstinacy had led to their expulsion from New York, and who later openly proclaimed detachment from civil affairs, played a vital role in serving the British interest during an imperial conflict with France. Exercising remarkable political awareness, Moravians managed the war’s refugee crisis, provided military intelligence to British forces, and engaged in high-level diplomacy that helped re-unify the Delaware and bring the tribe back into the British fold. As the missionary ethos of Post demonstrates, this evolution was not an arbitrary decision. Rather, it was a product of the recognition that Moravian security, and therefore the quixotic dream of a Civitas Indiana-Germana, was dependent on cooperation with political authority and the maintenance of British power. The Moravians could not divorce themselves from the growth of British imperialism, and when Indian warriors tore through the western frontier of Pennsylvania, the Moravians adapted.

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160 “Governor’s Views of the Character and Services of Frederick Post and a Passport for Him, 1759,” Pennsylvania Archives, 3: 579
Epilogue: The Collapse of a Dream, 1763

The Seven Years’ War formally ended in 1763, when representatives of Great Britain, France, and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris. Under the terms of the agreement, Britain seized control of French possessions in North America east of the Mississippi River. The land cession provision drew the ire of Native Americans who saw it as an unjustified imperial overreach that disrespected Native American sovereignty.\textsuperscript{162} Indeed, in May of 1763, a confederation of tribes under the Ottawa leader Pontiac launched a rebellion against the British to prevent them from occupying former French holdings in the Great Lakes region. The revolt would continue until 1766, and played a major role in expediting the passage of the Proclamation of 1763 in October of that year. In the ruling, King George declared that European settlers were forbidden from settling beyond the Appalachian Mountains, which would be the dividing line between European and Indian country.\textsuperscript{163}

In addition to forming the legal divide between settlers and Indians, Pontiac’s Rebellion gave birth to what colonial historian Peter Silver has called an “anti-Indian sublime.” White settlers portrayed Indians as an unrepentantly savage race, voicing resentment for past Indian allegiance to the French and Indian raids on English holdings during the war. To give just one example of this phenomenon, a 1766 play entitled Ponteach, or the Savages of America vividly portrays the murder of two Indians at the hands of European hunters. After describing the Indians as un-Christian barbarians who had killed their relatives in the recent war, the hunters fantasize about “eat[ing] an Indian’s Heart with Pleasure,” and denounce them as “Cursed revengeful, cruel, faithless devils!”\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{162} Gregory Evans Dowd, War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations & the British Empire, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 1
\textsuperscript{164} Cited in Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 128; A full exposition on the racialization of colonial borders in the post-Seven Years’ War era is beyond the scope of this paper. For the major works on this issue see, among others, Silver, Our Savage
The Paxton Boys of Pennsylvania underscored white racial distrust of Indians, and its importance vis-à-vis the Moravians and their converts. In November 1763, at the request of Moravian leaders, the Pennsylvania government had moved to Philadelphia 140 Moravian Indians from the small frontier settlements of Nain and Wechquetank. This was meant to protect the Indians from both Pontiac’s raiders and angry frontiersmen who no longer saw the distinction between friendly Indians and enemy Indians, but were content to dismiss all natives as savages. In response to what they saw as government inability to protect white settlers, Scots-Irish frontiersmen known as the Paxton boys brutally murdered twenty Conestoga Indians at their Lancaster settlement in December of 1763. Eyewitness William Henry relayed the “horrid sight” of a field of dead victims, and described one body in graphic terms: “[H]is legs were chopped with the tomahawk, his hands cut off, and finally a rifle ball discharged in his mouth.” In the face of such violent distrust, the Moravian Indians that eventually left Philadelphia did not return to their old settlement, but instead moved to the safety of Wyalusing, an eastern settlement away from the frontier.

Thus, the end of the Seven Years’ War did not usher in an era of peace, but rather one of mutual suspicion that gave rise to even greater racial and legal divides between settlers and Indians. As a result of Indian backlash to Britain’s increased dominance in North America, the middle ground on which the Moravians tried to build a Civitas Indiana-Germana began to disintegrate. Here, it is important to recall that White’s middle ground relied on neither side having a preponderance of power. This was no longer the case after the war’s conclusion. As opposed to a frontier of fluid power dynamics, cultural hybridity, and economic exchange, the border between British North

Neighbors; Merritt, At the Crossroads; and Krista Camenzind, “Violence, Race, and the Paxton Boys,” in Pencaek and Richter, eds., Friends and Enemies in Penn’s Woods, 201-221.
166 Camenzind, “Violence, Race, and the Paxton Boys,” 201
America and “Indian country” became an ossified divide between nations. Threatened by racial violence and unable to venture beyond the Proclamation Line of 1763, the Moravian holy experiment was confined by the boundaries of the colonies, often in settlements safely away from the racial tensions that defined the border. Only after the Patriot victory in the American Revolutionary War would the Moravians expand their missionary work westward once more.

The Moravians helped British imperialism to prosper, and now the very empire that they had helped create restricted their mission. Ultimately, the arrival of British dominance in North America was the death knoll for the planned Moravian Civitas Indiana-Germana. With the eyes of the British and their American successors set firmly on westward expansion, the Moravians could no longer hope to bring Indians and Europeans together into a single religious community. Indeed, one can understand the Moravian goal in Pennsylvania as the construction of a North American Jerusalem, a religious center from which the word of the Gospels would radiate out to the heathen of the continent. But with the growth of the Moravian dream came the growth of the British imperial dream. With the rise of the Moravian state came the expansion of the British Empire. And with British imperial triumph came the inevitable abandonment and collapse of the Moravian Jerusalem.

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Appendix of Figures

Figure 1 – Regional Map with 1763 Proclamation Line

The dark section around Lake Ontario illustrates Six Nations land holdings. As the Proclamation Line of 1763 illustrates, colonial Pennsylvania did not reach as far west as modern Pennsylvania, even after the Seven Years’ War. As such, towns like Shamokin were situated at the outermost reaches of the colony.

Zinzendorf envisioned the *Civitas Indiana-Germana* as a product of five outposts: Albany, NY (yellow), Shekomeko, NY (red), Ostonwakin, PA (green), Wyoming, PA (blue), and Bethlehem, PA (black). The New York outposts were no longer viable after the Moravians were expelled from New York.
Onondaga was the de facto capital of the Iroquois Confederacy, and is now known as Syracuse, New York.

Shamokin was a diverse Indian town on the Susquehanna River, where the Moravians formally settled in 1747. They abandoned the settlement in 1755 in the face of Indian raids.

As the westernmost Moravian town, Gnadenhütten was a linchpin of Moravian missionary efforts in Pennsylvania before the Seven Years’ War.

The Walking Purchase of 1737 engendered a deep hatred of the Pennsylvania government in Delaware leader Teedyuscung.

The raid on Gnadenhütten was just one of many Indian raids on western Pennsylvania settlements in the early years of the Seven Years’ War.

Christian Frederick Post journeyed west toward the Ohio River to negotiate with Delaware and Shawnee Indians that were allied with the French.